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  Abstract  
 
Growth in the price of college tuition concerns many students, parents, 
taxpayers and policymakers. Recently, the Davis Educational Foundation 
interviewed 70+ college presidents about their views of what’s driving tuition 
increases and their responses seemed to contrast sharply with research in 
leading economic and policy journals. My project will conduct a literature 
review in order to analyze, compare and contrast the reasons given by 
researchers and those given by university decision makers. In addition, this 
thesis will add local qualitative research with UVM stakeholder interviews, to 
better understand their perspective.  
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I. Introduction to the Project 
The extraordinary rise in the price of tuition (Figure 1) has led to serious 
questions about the factors driving up tuition at four year public universities in 
the United States. This is a topic that is of natural interest to economists, and 
has led to extensive research. To better understand the factors leading to the 
increase in the price of tuition, it is important to examine the explanations 
offered by university decision makers (deciders) in addition to the explanations 
offered by the academic literature (scholars). The explanations offered by 
deciders are important because they are ultimately responsible for whether 
tuition is raised or not.    
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the explanations offered by 
scholars and those offered by deciders. The scholars seek to offer solutions to 
the rapid increase in the price of tuition, and the deciders usually have to 
justify the decisions they make to raise tuition. As can be seen from Figure 1 
below, tuition inflation has far exceeded other price inflation in the U.S. 
economy. For example, if the price of bread had risen as fast as tuition, it 
would now cost about $12.00 per loaf, and the public would be demanding 
answers. In general, this thesis will attempt to provide some perspective and 
understanding on the issue of growth in the price of tuition. 
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Specifically, I proceed as follows.  The next section will review important 
milestones in the history of higher education as a background for tuition 
inflation.  Section 2A is an analysis and summary of scholars’ academic 
literature regarding tuition inflation starting with institutional factors inside 
higher education. These include price discrimination, the Bennett Hypothesis, 
poor management, and Bowen’s Revenue Theory.  Section 2B examines 
environmental factors outside higher education including Baumol’s Cost 
Disease.  Section 3 will bring in views of deciders including 70+ college 










CPI All CPI Ed Books CPI Education
Avg Hourly Earnings CPI Medical Care House Price
Figure 1. CPI Price Changes 1978=100, CPI of higher education compared to 
the CPI average hourly earnings, education related books, house prices, and 
medical care 1978-2015. Data obtained from FRED. 
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qualitative research derived from interviews with UVM decision makers.  
Section 4 describes possible policy prescriptions, and section 5 concludes.   
A. The Beginnings of Higher Education in the U.S.  
The history of higher education is extraordinarily important to 
understanding the take off in the average price of tuition. In 1638 Harvard 
established the typical DNA of future universities in the United States. Harvard 
created a model for various components of four year universities we see today: 
tenured faculty, research, residential life, graduate schools, variety in college 
majors, etc. Shortly thereafter, universities began popping up all over the 
United States. With this growth in the number of colleges, an internal tension 
between universities began to develop: the struggle between attracting more 
students, and providing an excellent education (Hutchinson, 2011).  
In 1944 the GI bill changed the landscape of higher education. Veterans 
flooded the higher education market. Accessibility of higher education 
continued to increase over the next decade. The college scholarship service 
(CSS) was established in 1954. The CSS established the first method to 
determine the financial need of student applicants. In 1958, the National 
Defense Education Act created the Perkins loan program for students attending 
both public and private universities, and the federal student aid program for 
low income students. As observed on the timeline below; a variety of 
institutions were created to help make college more affordable over this span of 
time. With all of these reforms, a college education became more accessible to a 
much broader base of people. (Cleeton, 2012) 
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Higher Education Time Line 
1636 Harvard sets model for Higher education in the U.S 
1643 First Scholarship awarded Harvard University  
1791 UVM Founded  
1862 Land Grant (Morrill) Act 
1890 Second Morrill Act 
1913 New York establishes a college scholarship program (Regents)  
1935 Indiana establishes the first student financial aid association  
1937 One of the first fellowship programs established - Public health service 
fellowship 
1944 GI Bill 
1946 Fulbright scholarship established  
1952 GI bill benefits extended  
National science foundation starts graduate fellowships 
1953 The first need analysis formula is presented by John Monro 
1954 College Scholarship Service created  
1958 National Defense Education Act establishes Perkins loan program and federal 
student aid program  
1964 Economic opportunity act 
1965 Higher education act of 1965 authorized most federal student financial aid 
programs  
Educational opportunity grant program (later the Pell grant) 
Figure 2. Brief timeline of the history of higher education. This figure lists some 
of the milestones in higher education.  
 
The incredible growth in demand for higher education can be observed in 
the history of higher education. The growth in the price of tuition effects a very 
broad base of people. The far reaching effects of this topic contribute greatly to 
its significance.  
II. Scholarly Literature  
A review of the academic literature revealed considerable controversy 
over what factors were causing the increase in the price of college tuition. In 
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1991 John Siegfried and Malcom Getz listed six factors driving up the price of 
tuition: cost disease, increase in cost due to a shortage in higher education 
inputs, increase in cost due to a shift towards more expensive disciplines, 
academic ratchet or when faculty and administrators change circumstances to 
suit their own desires, poor management in higher education, and increase in 
costs due to government regulation. That list divides into two opposing 
categories much like economists on this issue: factors outside of higher 
education in the broader economic sense, and factors that are specific to higher 
education institution itself.  
A. Institutional Factors 
Economists and other scholars who believe the rise in the price of tuition 
at public four year universities can be explained through a descriptive analysis 
of higher education stress the following themes as major contributors: price 
discrimination, poor management, Bowen’s revenue theory, and the Bennett 
hypothesis. 
1. Price Discrimination  
Price discrimination has historically been a common practice in higher 
education. Price discrimination generally occurs when a producer charges 
different customers different prices for the same product.  In a university 
context, it occurs when colleges charge students a different tuition price based 
on their personal financial situation. The apparent purpose of this practice is 
that it enhances total social welfare by increasing access and affordability for 
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students who could not afford the full tuition price otherwise. It also serves as 
an effective pricing strategy for the benefit of universities. Economists Robert A. 
Lawson and Ann Zerkle performed an empirical analysis of price discrimination 
in college tuition to show how universities use price discrimination to their 
benefit. Lawson and Zerkle argue price discrimination benefits universities by 
allowing them to systematically favor and provide greater access to better 
students, poorer students, and minority groups of students. According to 
Lawson and Zerkle (2006), 
Students who perform well in high school and score well on standardized 
tests receive considerably more than average students. Also, the 
university places value on racial diversity as indicated by the average of 
$2,240 awarded to students who are nonwhite, after controlling for other 
factors. The results of this study clearly indicate that university financial 
aid awards are based on merit, need and minority status. (p. 6) 
At times, however, price discrimination may damage welfare for needy 
students. This may happen when financial aid resources are reduced to keep 
revenues constant. Universities are forced to prioritize full pay students and 
limit the number of students they accept who need financial aid (Randolph, 
2010). In addition, price discrimination can create confusion for students when 
they are attempting to make their optimal college choice. If the student does 
not know the actual price until they are accepted into all the schools for which 
they applied, they are forced to make a decision under complicated 
circumstances (Randolph, 2010, p. 68). They may not even understand the role 
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financial aid plays in price discrimination and setting the tuition, and thus fail 
to apply to certain universities due to the sticker price of tuition. In the 
following section I will provide brief discussion about the role of price 
discrimination in the U.S, in general, followed by a discussion of its role in 
higher education. Then there will be a comparison of two economists’ views of 
the role of price discrimination in the increasing price of tuition at public four 
year universities.  
Price discrimination is not by any means a practice unique to higher 
education. There are many arenas in which U.S. consumers pay a different 
price for the same exact goods or services. One common example is movie 
theatre tickets. Theatres often charge a lower rate for children and seniors for 
the exact same seats in the theatre. At first glance, it may seem like an act of 
altruism, and for some businesses that may be true. However, by charging a 
lower price for those with less disposable income, theatres gain marginal 
revenues from customer segments that may not have been able to afford 
regular priced tickets at all.   
Price discrimination can be an efficient pricing strategy because it allows 
for an increase in gains from trade. With a downward sloping demand curve, 
this allows firms to effectively identify different groups of consumers that have 
different price elasticity of demand; it may be profitable for the firm, create a 
reduction in deadweight loss, and lead to a higher output level. Clearly there 
may be some customers who would be willing to pay full price but receive a 
discount. However, as in the theatre example, if price discrimination did not 
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occur the customers who were not willing to pay full price would not pay at all.  
Price discrimination may have some negative connotations, but consumers 
may benefit from their ability to pay a lower price. For them, a more 
standardized price would be a higher price. Price discrimination is employed as 
a pricing strategy in many industries (like theatre) to help mitigate deadweight 
loss, thus many economists view price discrimination as an overall benefit to 
society if total output increases (Wolla, 2014).  
In contrast, economists such as Leeson and Sobel (2006) have pointed 
out some flaws in the standard analysis of price discrimination. They found 
that sometimes when transaction costs are included, price discrimination is 
only beneficial to the firm, excluding the consumer benefit. This is not socially 
efficient (Leeson and Sobel, 2006, p. 394). Price discrimination is not a free and 
automatic process; it requires some effort from the firm. The firm will continue 
to price discriminate if their gains outweigh the transaction costs associated 
with price discrimination. This is efficient unless the transaction costs 
outweigh the deadweight loss. Firms will continue to price discriminate even if 
this is the case because their gains are reflected by the consumer surplus, and 
the reduction in deadweight loss. However, this is only beneficial to the firm 
because their costs are greater than gains to society. So, if the transaction 
costs of the price discriminating firm are higher than the deadweight loss, then 
price discrimination is no longer socially efficient as it is no longer providing a 
mutual benefit.   
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Financial aid is the main channel through which price discrimination is 
practiced at universities, thus it is important to briefly outline the purpose and 
definition of financial aid as it pertains to universities. Financial aid is any 
grant or scholarship, loan, or paid employment given to students to meet their 
financial need determined by their college expenses. Typically, financial aid is 
divided into two categories: merit based aid, and need based aid. Merit based 
aid is offered on the basis of desired skills, performance, or other 
characteristics. Need based aid is often offered due to demonstrated financial 
need. Often the determinants of eligibility for the two types of aid are much 
more complicated than summarized above. Colleges, individuals, private 
parties, and organizations have attempted to help support the education of 
deserving but needy students for a long time. In his book Aiding Students, 
Buying Students: Financial Aid in America, Rupert Wilkinson provides an in 
depth analysis of financial aid in U.S. universities. The first need based 
scholarship awarded can be traced back to Harvard University in 1643 
(Wilkinson, 2005). Wilkinson argues that a drastic change occurred in U.S. 
financial aid after World War II. The federal government began intervening in 
financial aid as a result of the New Deal policies in the 1930’s, but Wilkinson 
argues that it was the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 that truly 
changed the landscape. There was an influx in soldiers looking to take 
advantage of getting a college education upon returning from the war, and the 
number of students enrolled in colleges during this time period grew rapidly. 
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Wilkinson argues that it is during this period that colleges began competing for 
the most skilled students, and where merit based financial aid came from.  
In 1954 the CSS was established. This was the first establishment whose 
primary purpose was to standardize the assessment of student’s needs, so they 
could better calculate how much aid that student should receive. This system 
utilized compiled characteristics of each student’s family to determine if they 
were in need of assistance. Parents were required to submit extensive 
documentation. The CSS calculated the needs of each student, and send it to 
the prospective universities. As Wilkinson points out, the CSS is very similar to 
the college entrance examination board (Wilkinson, 2005, 127-128). This was 
also a defined point at which it became more difficult for students to choose a 
university because the sticker price was much less relevant than it had been in 
years past.   
As mentioned previously, price discrimination has been used consistently 
in the history of higher education. However, there seems to have been a shift 
from price discrimination used as a strategy to obtain particular students, to 
being utilized as a way to achieve university objectives, such as diversifying the 
student body. Since 1954, universities have been using personal financial 
information of students to practice price discrimination in tuition pricing. The 
very intricate package of information that colleges assemble is used to create a 
financial aid package unique to each student. Each financial aid package 
results in students paying a price according to their ability to pay and how well 
they are able to meet or further the goals of the institution of higher education.    
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In The Rising Cost of College: Tuition, Financial Aid and Price 
Discrimination, economist Scott Wolla discusses internal factors driving up the 
price of tuition through the role of third party payments, in a twist on price 
discrimination. In this study, Wolla examines the financial aid policies of 
Harvard University to determine how much of a cost financial aid imposes 
upon the University.  Wolla uses basic economic theory to determine who bears 
the cost burden. At Harvard, in 2012, families earning less than $65,000 a year 
received on average $41,000 in grants. Wolla argues that the $41,000 grant 
burden is not experienced by the university, but by students from families with 
higher incomes who pay a much higher price of tuition, thus subsidizing the 
students that come from low income families. Wolla argues that price 
discrimination allows universities to charge many different prices for 
essentially the same service. This allows universities to transfer the cost 
burden from low income families to wealthier families. In other words, 
universities can enjoy the benefits of charging higher prices without 
experiencing the consequences of excluding low income students because the 
wealthier students are subsidizing the low income students. This contributes to 
the growth in the price of tuition if more students of need are admitted because 
more revenue is needed to subsidize those students. As shown in the timeline, 
access to and affordability of higher education has increased over time. A much 
broader base of students are now seeking a college education. This increased 
access coupled with increasing inequality creates a greater need for high 
income students who are able to pay for full tuition.  
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In Price Discrimination and Rising Costs: Is There Any Relationship?, 
Gregory Randolph argues price discrimination has provided universities with 
the necessary tools to be able to more comfortably raise the sticker price. 
However, he distinguishes between sticker price and net price, and he argues 
students seldom pay the sticker price. Randolph discusses the transaction 
costs as a huge factor in determining if price discrimination is actually driving 
up the price of tuition. Randolph argues that price discrimination burdens 
students in several ways. First, is lack of information. It is more difficult to 
make a college choice when students do not know the true price of attending a 
particular university. Another cost is the sheer time students must spend 
applying for financial aid. Overall, Randolph argues that as long as universities 
focus price discrimination efforts on subsidizing low income students, not high 
paying students or student with better ability or specific attributes, then price 
discrimination is socially efficient and is only a marginal factor driving up the 
price of tuition. This differs greatly from Wolla’s opinion that price 
discrimination is a main driving factor in increasing the price of tuition at 
universities.  
Economists such as Wolla, and Vedder cite that price discrimination 
increases the price of tuition because it creates a system in which universities 
raise the sticker price so that full pay students generate more revenue. Then 
universities use that revenue to subsidize students who cannot pay as much. 
In a country of growing inequality but greater demand for access to higher 
education, there is a greater number of students who need financial assistance. 
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Absent other forms of revenue, universities may raise the sticker price to 
generate more revenue to fund the subsidization of low income students. As 
seen in Figure 3 below, students in the lowest income bracket are paying about 
half of the price that students from wealthier backgrounds pay.  
 
Figure 3.  The net price paid by a student at a four year public university based 
upon income. The net price is the price paid after financial aid.  Data obtained 
from National center for education statistics. 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_330.10.asp 
 
Universities need to attract wealthier students. Price discrimination 













Avg tuition , fees, room and board
Net Price Paid by Public University Students Based on Income 
2013 - 2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2009-2010
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possible negative effects associated with practicing price discrimination ‘too 
much’. 
 
2. The Bennett Hypothesis  
The Bennett hypothesis is closely tied to price discrimination. This 
hypothesis states that increases in financial aid lead to an increase in tuition. 
When financial aid is increased, with the intention of making college more 
affordable for students, the Bennett hypothesis predicts that universities will 
instead capture those funds by increasing tuition (Bennett, 2013, p. 31). In a 
1987 New York Times op-ed, former Education Secretary William Bennett 
asserted that colleges take advantage of federal student loan and grant 
programs by raising tuition and fees to capture most of the financial aid for 
themselves. This results in universities experiencing the benefits of increased 
aid, not students1.  
In Accounting for the Rise in College Tuition, Grey Gordon and Aaron 
Hedlund studied the net tuition increase between 1987 and 2010. In their 
model they create a monopolistic college, and a fixed measure of heterogeneous 
households that upon high school graduation must make a college enrollment 
decision. The college turns students into graduates which allows them to enter 
the workforce, and then eventually retire. In this model the government levies 
taxes to finance a student loan program. Their model indicates that “demand 
                                                             
1 Richard Vedder stressed Bennett’s hypothesis as a major explanation for rising tuition when 
testifying before the United States Senate Budget Committee in June 2014.  
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side theories have the most predictive power” (Gordon and Hedlund, 2016). 
They actually argue that the Bennett Hypothesis can account for the tuition 
increase on its own. The authors also found that expansions in financial aid in 
any form will lead to a tuition response from a college. This response crowds 
out the intended additional enrollment that would have occurred if the 
financial aid actually lowered the cost. These authors find financial aid would 
lead to an enrollment decline. In their study, the authors also found that this 
tuition response would lead to an increase in the loans per student. Although 
these authors studied demand shocks in isolation, they found that the demand 
shock of increased subsidies (financial aid, loan eligibility etc.) led to an 
increase in the costs of higher education, an increase in student debt, and as 
the authors found, the labor market returns are not high enough to account for 
the previously mentioned increase. This evidently results in a surge in loan 
default rates.  
Economists Ehrenberg and Murphy examined the inefficiency of financial 
aid policies at universities. In What Price Diversity, they responded to the 
Justice Department’s investigation into the group of colleges that met annually 
to compare financial aid awards for admitted students, which resulted in 
United States v. Brown University (1992). Ehrenberg and Murphy examined the 
sustainability of “need-blind” financial aid policies at universities. The authors 
hypothesized that financial aid policies based solely on need at colleges and 
universities were not sustainable. The authors discussed the Bennett 
Hypothesis as primary reason for their hypothesis. Ehrenberg and Murphy 
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performed a case study of Cornell University and examined the following 
factors that contributed to the rise in the price of tuition at Cornell from the 
1960’s into the 1990’s: costs associated with infrastructure, technology, library 
improvement and maintenance, faculty salaries, governmental support, 
financial aid and endowments. In the case study, the authors find that due to 
the financial aid policies at Cornell, increasing tuition levels led to an increase 
in grant assistance due to Cornell’s obligations outlined in their own financial 
aid policies. An increase in provided grant assistance increases the institution’s 
costs, thus increasing tuition. It is a cycle. The authors hypothesize that the 
university’s need-based financial aid policies should change so that less need-
based aid is given, or fewer students are admitted who require need-based aid.  
Ehrenberg and Murphy examined the process by which increasing the number 
of students who need financial assistance increases the costs of universities, 
which may lead to them increasing tuition in order to pay for the increased 
assistance. This could result in less access to higher education for low income 
students (Ehrenberg and Murphy, 1993).   
In For Whom the Pell Tolls: The Response of University Tuition to Federal 
Grants-in-Aid, economists Larry D. Singell and Joe A. Stone (2003) wanted to 
explore the public debate about Pell grants being appropriated by universities 
through increases in tuition: consistent with the Bennett hypothesis. To do this 
they analyzed a panel of 1554 colleges and universities from 1989 to 1996. The 
analysis focuses on federal Pell grants primarily because the Pell program is 
the largest federal grant program, funding more students than any other single 
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program. Their results indicated that public universities act like private 
universities when it pertains to out of state tuition: 
 We find little evidence of the Bennett hypothesis for in-state tuition for 
public universities. For private universities, though, increases in Pell grants 
appear to be matched nearly one for one by increases in list (and net) tuition [my 
emphasis]. Results for out-of-state tuition for public universities are similar to 
those for private universities, suggesting that they behave more like private 
ones in setting out-of-state tuition. Institutional responses in these latter cases 
appear at odds with federal grants-in-aid policy. (Singell & Stone, 2003, p. 2)  
The authors predicted that Pell grants would yield a larger tuition 
increase under the Bennett hypothesis because they increase student 
resources more directly than loans.  
All of these scholars emphasize the Bennett Hypothesis as a factor 
leading to growth in the price of tuition because there has also been a growth 
in financial aid.  
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Figure 3. The percentage of student receiving financial aid at public four year 
universities has been growing between 2000 and 2013. Data obtained from 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_331.20.asp 
 
3. Management Issues  
Another major theme economists describe is management issues in 
higher education. Institutions of higher education are nonprofit institutions, 
which are rigid in regards to change, and possess a specific government 
structure that may be described as counterproductive. There are many factors 







Percentage of Students Receiving Financial Aid at Public Universites
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education. Although some feel poor management is a marginal factor, others 
feel these factors compile and create a main factor driving up the price of 
tuition.   
For example, many scholars argue that poor governance, internal 
inefficiencies, and a lack of accountability are main driving factors because 
those factors increase costs for the university. In Going Broke by College 
Degree: Why College Costs Too Much?, Richard Vedder explains why 
institutions of higher education are set up for management issues. Vedder 
exposes the inefficiencies of universities to demonstrate that the rise in the 
price of tuition is a result of declining productivity combined with minimal 
price sensitivity of students, which is a result of third party payments (2004).  
Economists such as Vedder feel that institutions of higher education are 
set up for failure. In other words, they have to work harder to bring market 
forces into their institutions or make particular adjustments to become 
efficient. Efficiency in institutions of higher education is an uphill battle. One 
example of poor management in educational institutions can be found in 
Educational Achievement and The Cost of Bureaucracy by Gary Anderson, 
William Shughart and Robert Tollison. These economists sought to answer the 
following question; does the size of the educational bureaucracy have any effect 
on the efficiency of school systems in producing educational achievement? 
They sought to understand how allocating school resources in alternative ways 
would impact student achievement in public high schools. In this study they 
measured “educational achievement” through standardized test scores and 
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graduation rates. Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1991) explain bureaucracy 
in this way;  
Nationally, teacher salaries account for 35.2% of state and local school 
budgets. Capital outlays and interest charges - i.e., the annual cost of 
‘the four walls’ enclosing the classroom - account for another 8.3%. This 
leaves 56.5% of expenditures unaccounted for.’ The residual amount 
goes to pay the salaries of non-teacher public school staff, to purchase 
materials, and to cover other costs. These expenditures can be 
characterized as the cost of school bureaucracy broadly define. (p. 30)  
They used data from the U.S Department of Education from public high 
schools in 49 states. They recognize that the empirical evidence of teacher to 
pupil ratio on student performance was ambiguous. They also recognize it was 
difficult to account for the relative prices of teachers versus non-teachers. This 
was important so that any relative price effects could be accounted for. 
Shughart, Anderson, and Tollison explain their findings as follows:  
Our results suggest that merely by cutting back on the number of 
administrators, public school systems will produce more graduates who 
perform better. Over some range of the educational production function, 
then, the school systems may be able to get something for nothing. The 
something is better student performance; the nothing is getting rid of 
various curriculum development specialists, and other non-participants 
25 | C u d é  
 
in the educational process who absorb scarce budgetary resources (and 
student time) (p.44). 
Clearly one limitation to this study is the relevance of the rising costs of 
higher education. However, this study demonstrates the real effects of 
allocating resources in alternative ways on student performance in an 
educational institution. Clearly there are many differences between Pre k-12 
and higher education, however, this study may be useful if applied to 
institutions of higher education. Maybe a study such as this one would shed 
some light on the role of non-faculty staff and inefficient allocation of resources 
in growth of tuition at public universities.  
The issue described by Shughart is comparable to what Archibald and 
Feldman label as ‘administrative lattice’ or ‘administrative bloat’ (Archibald and 
Feldman, 2007, p. 4-6). 
Table 1 
 









All Staff 1,783,328 2,136,970 2,484,820 20% 16% 
Professional staff 1,133,264 1,477,953 1,865,269 30% 26% 
Executive/administrative/ 
managerial 
84,446 82,811 112,473 -2% 36% 
Faculty (instruction/research/  
public service)  
580,908 771,124 953,230 33% 24% 
Other professionals 294,350 404,543 513,661 37% 27% 
Nonprofessional staff 650,064 659,017 619,551 1% -6% 
Non instruction  1,028,860 1,146,371 1,245,685 11% 9% 
 
Note: *Data collected from the National center for education statistics  
*Non-instruction is the sum of ‘executive/administrative/managerial’, ‘other professionals’ and 
‘nonprofessional staff’ 
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Administrative lattice refers to the increase in university administrative 
staffs2. According to Benjamin Ginsberg,  
In 1975 colleges employed one administrator for every eighty-four 
students and one professional staffer—admissions officers, information 
technology specialists, and the like—for every fifty students. By 2005, the 
administrator-to-student ratio had dropped to one administrator for 
every sixty-eight students while the ratio of professional staffers had 
dropped to one for every twenty-one students. (2011)  
Other economists such as Holian and Ross examine incentives for poor 
management in university settings. Holian and Ross examine the extent to 
which each certain ‘market-like’ managerial practice should be utilized in 
higher education (Holian and Ross, 2010). The first managerial practice is 
outsourcing, which is simply contracting with a professional not employed by 
the university to fix something for the university. One example of outsourcing 
may be hiring Sodexo to provide dining services on campus. Second, 
decentralization occurs when universities use formal and informal mechanisms 
to give smaller units, such as colleges, more control. This may be better for 
efficiency because those who are making the decision are much more likely to 
be effected by the result of those decisions. According to Holian and Ross 
universities should be conscious of their comparative advantages. They should 
                                                             
2 This issue was also mentioned in a documentary about the rising costs of higher education, 
called “Ivory Tower” 
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also outsource where a service is not within their core mission/activities. This 
can help save them time and money; it is more efficient if universities focus on 
what they do best, rather than try to be the creator and manager of every 
aspect of a college campus (food, housing, creation of new technologies, 
volunteer programs, etc.). Holian and Ross stress that there are some things 
universities do not need to outsource, but they feel sometimes universities are 
too broad in determining what fits under their core activities.  
In addition, according to Holian and Ross, universities may also change 
the way they budget to increase efficiency: “try to bring funding in line with 
revenue, and the central administration may use transfer pricing to coordinate 
activities across the university” (Holian and Ross, 2010, p. 229). The benefit of 
this kind of budgeting is that individual colleges have a better sense of how 
funds should be allocated to better improve incentives. However, this can also 
cause “unhealthy self-interest pursuit of individual units” (Holian and Ross, 
2010, p. 229). An example of this would be individual colleges scurrying to get 
students by creating general education course duplicates because each college 
gets to keep the tuition revenue they bring in. This may result in colleges 
pandering too much to what students want for general education requirements, 
such as offering easier classes, just to get the extra tuition revenue.  Overall, if 
implemented correctly, this system can create an environment that allows for 
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better informed budget decisions3. The authors stressed the importance of 
transparent finances in the success of these types of budget programs.  
Holian and Ross also discuss management issues with regards to pricing 
of class and room size. Universities do not differentiate the price of a credit 
hour based on class size. This is wasteful because universities lose information 
about how resources should be allocated to provide education (Holian & Ross, 
2010, p. 230). Prices provide information, allocation, and incentives. For 
example, if universities differentiated the price of a credit hour based on class 
size, then it might be cheaper for a student to take a class of 100 or more 
students than a class of 20 students. Another example may be if universities 
differentiated the price of a credit hour based upon class (or subject), so a 
chemistry class may be more expensive than an English class. If price is not 
based upon class and room size, it is more difficult for students to find their 
most ideal instruction style. Universities are faced with tough decisions 
frequently about how to best utilize space, and failing to establish some sort of 
price system deprives universities of information that could help them 
determine which choice would be the most efficient. In an effort to help “higher 
education administrators”, or deciders, design better systems, the authors 
outline the debate over the ‘marketization’ of university campuses, and the 
benefits and costs associated with decentralization and outsourcing at 
universities. They believe that outsourcing and decentralization will greatly 
                                                             
3 UVM is trying this through the use of Incentive based budgeting (IBB).  
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improve the focus of the university, incentives, and use of local knowledge. 
However, they stress that a specific tailored balance is needed for each 
university, as there are some costs associated with this type of budgeting.  
Other economists focus on the governance structures of universities. 
Some university government structures lack the proper incentives to become 
efficient, such as college boards. In their study Paying Our Presidents: What do 
Trustees Value, authors Ehrenberg, Cheslock and Epifantseva investigated the 
link between pay of university presidents and performance of universities as a 
possible factor driving up the price of tuition. They used data from a panel of 
over 400 institutions, on the salaries and benefits of university and college 
presidents for the years 1992-1993 and 1996-1997. According to the authors, 
the sample in this study is characterized by the following traits: typical 
university presidents began their presidency at the age of 48 and had been in 
the position for over 8 years at the time the data was collected, 15% of the 
presidents were members of the clergy, 18% were female, and 25% had held at 
least one previous presidency. In analyzing compensation and benefits, the 
authors examined a variety of factors such as the average salaries of the 
presidents, the change in salary overtime, benefits received by presidents, post 
presidency activities, and the size and budget of the relevant institutions. The 
authors performed an empirical analysis to address the relationship between 
salary increases and factors of institutional performance4 over a 4 year period. 
                                                             
4 According to Ehrenberg, Cheslock and Epifantseva (2000) Factors that contribute to 
institutional performance are “higher endowments per student, larger enrollments, higher 
average faculty salaries and entering classes with higher average test scores” (page 10)  
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One limitation to this study was the difficulty of assessing the actual rewards 
for performance increases because rewards do not always come in the form of a 
salary increase. The authors also found that it was important to distinguish 
between the types of universities; for example, they found that age is positively 
associated with higher salary at research and doctoral universities, but age is 
negatively associated with higher salary at liberal arts colleges. Using this data, 
they tried to infer what factors the trustees value in making the decision to 
raise university president salaries. In conclusion, the authors did not find 
enough support for their hypothesis: that compensation of university 
presidents and changes of presidents’ salaries are related to measures of their 
institutions’ performance. The authors did caution that they analyzed salary 
and compensation change for a sample of university presidents over a four year 
period in the 1990’s. They acknowledge that rewards for presidents may not 
always be reflected in their salary at all, or in that time, presidents may be 
rewarded in other ways post presidency (for example they may be offered 
opportunities5). 
One last aspect of management is what Archibald and Feldman call 
‘academic ratchet’: a result of the governance structure, which itself is a result 
of poor management (Archibald and Feldman, 2007, p. 19). Academic ratchet is 
a term used to describe the observed effects of faculty in positions of power 
with the wrong incentives. Some economists have observed that the actual 
                                                             
5 According to Ehrenberg, Cheslock and Epifantseva (2000) one example of an ‘opportunity 
reward’ may be movement to a higher paying position (p. 6)  
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value of faculty labor is heavily dependent upon their ‘discretionary work’, not 
their quality of instruction. Massy and Zemsky (2006) coined the term output 
creep referring to the tendency of faculty output, or work, to slowly shift away 
from undergraduate education, and the success of undergraduate students, to 
activities that come with recognition or rewards. Activities such as graduate 
work, research, professional development, and consulting have shown to 
accompany increased compensation and recognition. Faculty who focus on 
activities other than instruction are rewarded. 
 Overall, according to these scholars, management issues drive up costs, 
which necessitates an increase in revenue, thus an increase in tuition.  
4. Bowen’s Revenue Theory  
Howard Bowen was an American economist and university president. He 
wrote about the “revenue theory of cost” as it applies to higher education. In 
the 1980’s Bowen’s “revenue theory of costs”, sometimes called Bowen’s Law, 
outlined four rules for institutions of higher education: 
1. The institution will spend all the money it raises. 
2. The institution will seek to raise as much funds as possible. 
3. The main priority and goals of the institution are excellence, 
prestige and influence. 
4. The institution will spend any amount to achieve or maintain those 
goals.  
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As states decrease funding, and more universities are in the market, 
universities must compete with each other on the grounds of prestige, 
excellence, and influence. A simple way to raise funds is to raise tuition, and 
the more tuition is raised, the more prestigious the university appears to be.  
As discussed earlier, it is hard to determine the quality of a public four 
year degree as a product. Economist Archibald argues that schools can signal 
higher quality with their sticker price (2007). Universities can increase tuition 
and expenditures, and this will signal greater prestige. In a 2014 study, 
Economists Martin and Hill examined the effects of Bowen’s theory in research 
universities. They analyzed the effect under tight and loose revenue 
constraints. Martin and Hill define tight revenue constraint and loose revenue 
constraint as the degree of revenue constriction “determined by economic 
conditions and how the public values higher education.” (p. 4) Martin and Hill 
found,  
The period from 1980 to the financial crisis is known as the ‘great 
moderation’, when economic conditions were good and, according to 
surveys, the public placed an ever higher value on postsecondary 
education. After the financial crisis, economic conditions became severe 
and the public was pressed by the cost of higher education. (p. 34)  
Those two periods represent a scenario in which universities were under 
tight or loose revenue constraints. Under loose revenue constraints, Bowen’s 
“revenue theory of cost” accounted for a 51% change in cost at public 
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universities, and under tight constraint Bowen’s “revenue theory of cost” 
accounted for 29% of changes in cost at public universities. Overall, Bowen’s 
theory seems to emphasize the lack of incentives present for universities to 
minimize costs. This theory demonstrates the degree to which universities are 
set up for failure in terms of minimizing cost and increasing efficiency.  
Some economists feel that there are factors driving up the price of 
tuition, which are caused and maintained from inside institutions of higher 
education. As discussed in the previous section, these factors include problems 
associated with poor management, price discrimination, and Bowen’s revenue 
theory. However, there are economists who feel those factors are merely 
marginal. Some economists feel that factors specific to universities are mostly 
marginal factors contributing to the growth in the price of tuition. Rather, the 
factors causing tuition to increase are a result of forces outside of institutions 
themselves. These scholars emphasize environmental factors as major 
contributors to the growth in the price of tuition. They find great value in 
looking to other industries similar to higher education that experience the 
same price increases, to better understand the main causal factors.  
Overall, Bowen’s theory seems to emphasize the lack of incentives for 
universities to minimize costs. This theory demonstrates the degree to which 
universities, institutionally, are set up for failure in terms of minimizing cost 
and increasing efficiency.  
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B. Environmental Factors 
Scholars who emphasize environmental factors also agree that price 
discrimination, poor management, Bowen’s revenue theory and the Bennett 
hypothesis are all factors, but just marginal factors.  Archibald and Feldman 
argue that although poor management is a contributing factor, they believe the 
main factor is technological improvements and Baumol’s cost disease:  
We do not argue that colleges and universities are particularly efficient 
organizations. But we are not persuaded that rising inefficiency offers a 
very good accounting for the pattern of cost increases in the higher 
education industry over long sweeps of time. (2010)  
Other scholars feel that the factors contributing to the growth in the 
price of tuition are a result of environmental factors, or forces outside the 
institutions themselves. This approach looks to other industries similar to 
higher education, which also experience price increases, to better understand 
the common causal effects.    
1. Baumol’s Cost Disease 
Higher education is a service industry, and it resembles other service 
industries such as lawyers, dentistry, and physicians. Some scholars think a 
major driver of the increase in the price of tuition has been Baumol’s cost 
disease. Baumol’s cost disease effects industries that experience slower 
productivity growth when compared to other industries in the economy. In an 
effort to remain competitive with other industries, which have experienced an 
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increase in wages due to an increase in productivity, an industry such as 
higher education will have little productivity growth, so prices have to rise more 
than in industries that do experience productivity growth. They have to remain 
competitive to attain valuable faculty. Although the economists who fall into 
this category agree that the factors listed in the previous sections are factors 
driving up the price of tuition, they feel those factors are marginal factors in 
comparison with Baumol’s disease.  
Economists Archibald and Feldman researched the effects of Baumol’s 
cost disease on higher education. Archibald and Feldman assert that “costs in 
higher education must rise faster than the general inflation rate as long as 
productivity growth at colleges and universities lags behind productivity growth 
in the rest of the economy” (2011, p. 114). In Why Does College Cost So Much?, 
Archibald and Feldman argue that external forces associated with economic 
growth and technological advancement drive up the price of tuition at 
universities. The authors utilized empirical data of prices over time that show 
the costs of service industries (such as dentists, lawyers and physicians) align 
with the prices of higher education from the 1940’s to 2010. 
Archibald and Feldman conducted their research over the course of 10 
years. They argue that the low supply of highly educated labor with PhD’s 
drives up the price of that labor. Universities need highly educated employees, 
and since the supply hasn’t caught up with the demand, those employees are 
expensive, and this drives up the price of tuition.  The authors also emphasize 
Baumol's theory, in that labor intensive non-traded goods benefit less from 
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technological improvements because the technology is expensive and requires 
more expensive labor to operate that equipment6. This applies to factors as 
simple as classroom supplies: “In higher education the chalk, paper, pen, and 
test tube world has been replaced by wired buildings, laptops, high-tech 
classrooms, and pulsed laser systems in physics labs, together with the 
specialists needed to make the systems work” (Archibald and Feldman, 2007 p. 
17).  
According to Archibald and Feldman (2007) demand for technology, due 
to technological advancement, drives up the costs associated with the product 
of higher education, whereas it may have the opposite effect on a different 
industry:  
Yet a skill-intensive personal service industry like higher education is 
different from basic manufacturing industries producing a homogeneous 
output that is essentially unchanging over time. Its unusual nature stems in 
part from the fact that genuine productivity enhancements are much more 
difficult to achieve. (p. 16)  
Industries that produce products such as food, shoes, or the automotive 
industry experience a decrease in real costs with technological improvement, 
whereas service industries have seen an increase in costs. Archibald and 
Feldman do recognize some reduction in costs associated with technological 
                                                             
6 For example, the two main factors that are driving up the costs of healthcare are globalization 
and technological improvement. 
37 | C u d é  
 
improvement in higher education7, but they emphasize the difference between 
higher education as a service industry, and other industries.  
Archibald and Feldman (2007) explain the significance of technological 
improvement in higher education as follows:  
The outputs of higher education are the inputs of other industries. This 
forces higher education institutions to educate students to a standard 
influenced in part by those who will hire its students. The undergraduate 
chemist, for instance, has to be able to understand and operate the equipment 
used in a modern industrial chemistry lab. Without this knowledge he or she 
would not be useful to the pharmaceutical industry or the bio-technology 
industry, industries that have themselves adopted a series of technological 
advancements that raise the quality of their output. As a result, the motive for 
technological change in higher education often traces more to enhancements of 
the education offered than to cost control. Although the typing pool example 
shows how technological progress could decrease costs, the net effect of 
adopting new techniques has increased costs in higher education. (p. 18)8  
Archibald and Feldman are convinced in the value of looking to similar 
industries to better understand the price increases in higher education. While 
analyzing the growth in the price of a college education, they found that higher 
                                                             
7 One example of a reduction in costs due to technological improvement is a decrease in 
administrative staff due to word processing technology (Archibald and Feldman, 2007, p. 10)  
8 According to Archibald and Feldman (2007) technological improvement effects other service 
industries in a similar way, for example patients of physicians are always increasing their 
expected standard of care. Patients expect their doctors to keep up with somewhat recent 
technology. (p.8)  
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education resembles other service industries. Archibald and Feldman argue 
that Baumol’s cost disease and technological improvement have been the main 
factors driving up the price of tuition, as well as the costs of other service 
industries.  
C. Summary 
As shown, there are a variety of theories that explain the expedient 
growth in the price of tuition over time. Most economists agree that each factor 
mentioned in this paper tell part of the story, however, they disagree in regard 
to extent to which each factor influences the growth in the price of tuition. It is 
important to understand which factors are the key drivers because that will 
inform efforts to develop effective solutions if targeted at the most influencing 
factor. Unfortunately, there is great debate amongst the scholars themselves as 
to what the biggest driving factor is.  
Although most of the leading theories were captured in the preceding 
analysis, resolving disputes between leading scholars on which factors better 
explain tuition inflation is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper simply 
outlines the scholars’ major theories and contrasts them with those who have 
responsibility for tuition increases - university decision makers or deciders. 
Deciders in university administrations are in the driver’s seat of this 
national issue. Little research was discovered that explained in a satisfactory 
way why tuition has gone up according to those actually influencing or making 
the decision to raise tuition. 
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III. The “University Decision Makers” perspective 
A. Introduction 
In this section, the perspectives of ‘university decision makers’, or those 
making or influencing the decision to raise tuition, will be explained. The 
university decision makers’ perspectives are compiled from two sources. The 
first source is a report from the Davis Educational Foundation. The Davis 
Educational Foundation is a public charitable foundation that “supports higher 
education cost containment and improvements to teaching and learning in the 
undergraduate programs of colleges and universities throughout the six New 
England states.” (p. 3) 
The Davis Educational Foundation researched the perspectives of New 
England university presidents, and achieved an impressive 50% response rate 
from over 70 university presidents responding to the following question: “Why 
are annual tuition increases outpacing the growth of inflation?” The report 
compiled the responses from the university presidents and provided quotes, 
and although the presidents who responded were listed, the quotes were 
anonymous. The second source will be quotes from qualitative interviews with 
five university decision makers at the University of Vermont. The following 
UVM decision makers were interviewed:  
 Stacey Kostell- Vice President for Enrollment Management  
 Daniel Fogel - Former University President  
 Debbie McAneny – UVM Board Chair  
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 Jane Knodell – Former Provost and current faculty member in the UVM 
Economics Department  
 David Daigle – Self-Perpetuating Trustee  
Like the report from the Davis Educational Foundation, the quotes from 
UVM university decision makers will be anonymous.  
The goal of the following section is to present the university decision 
makers’ perspectives on why tuition is growing at four year public universities, 
and to compare their perspective with the explanations offered by scholars in 
the literature.  
Some of the quotes in this section do not necessarily explain why tuition 
has grown, but if a particular theme was mentioned several times in separate 
interviews, I felt it was important to present those quotes in this thesis because 
it was part of their individual perspective on this issue. As there is very little 
research on the perspectives of university decision makers on the growth in the 
price of tuition, I would like to put forth as much information as possible so 
readers may see the perspectives of university decisions makers in a more 
holistic manner.  
  To begin, I would like to offer some quotes that shed light on the way in 
which university decision makers think about this topic. Only one university 
decision maker expressed little concern over the growth in the price of tuition: 
“My view is simple. Real costs increases adjusted for inflation at public 
research universities have been roughly a quarter of one percent per year.” 
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However, as shown later in Figure 10, the average published tuition and fees 
for in state students at public four year universities increased from $4,400 in 
1995 to $9,410 in 2015. The net tuition and fees increased from $2,300 in 
1995 to $3,980 in 2015. This is a larger increase than a quarter of one percent 
per year.  
The same university decision maker gave several examples as to how the 
real growth is not as significant as it is commonly understood to be: “public 
higher education revenues per student have been almost flat in real dollars 
from 1985 to 2010, the increase over the 25 years covered in that span come to 
a little more than $1,000, or roughly $40 per year.” Public higher education 
revenues per student have not been somewhat flat, even if they had been the 
problem or panic associated with the growing price of tuition is centered on the 
price to students (student access, affordability etc.). Examining the educational 
revenues per student ignores a fundamental factor, and that is how those 
revenues are generated. As shown below, the burden of costs have been shifted 
more and more onto students rather than other sources of revenue.   
In 1989 net tuition as a percent of educational revenue was 23.8%. By 
2013 it had almost doubled to 47.5%. As tuition becomes a larger portion of 
revenue, students have to pay more, unless there is a reduction in revenue at 
the same time. There has not been a reduction in revenue. As shown in the 
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figure below, revenue at public four year universities has been increasing along 




























































































































Figure 4. Increasing net tuition as a percent of higher education total educational 
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The figure below shows that both total revenue and revenue from tuition 
and fees have grown: 
 
Figure 5. Growth in total revenue and tuition and fees as a portion of revenue 
at public four year universities. Source 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_333.10.asp. 
 
It was evident during the interviews that university decision makers feel 
the government fails to adequately support universities: “it used to be that 
governments used to support the purposes of universities. Now governments 
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Total revenues 202,511,496 221,882,332 223,566,529 216,432,317 248,104,870 265,941,566 261,153,808
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Fees at Public Four Year Universties 
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want universities to support the purposes of government; job creation, 
economic development.”  
Except for the one, most university decision makers expressed great 
concern over the rising price of tuition and how that affects students. In 
response to the first question of the interview, “generally, what do you think 
about the growth in the price of tuition at public four year universities in the 
United States?”, one decider made the following comment: “it’s the last thing I 
think about before I go to sleep and the first thing I think about when I wake 
up in the morning.” Most deciders were fairly aware of the concern over the 
growth in tuition:  
I know over the last few years we have done everything we can to keep 
the tuition increases at 3 or 4%, but I agree with you that it is still over 
the cost of living. Believe me, I have tried every combination of things, 
but when you have to balance state appropriation that’s lowest in the 
country to the rising costs of health insurance, to the rising demand for 
financial aid, to making sure that we drive excellence, to our aging 
buildings, we have to balance the real mitigating tuition increases, while 
at the same time trying to offer what’s needed.  
Many deciders said that they thought “the problem of increasing tuition 
is a national problem.” Some expressed their feeling of helplessness as a 
university decision maker in the midst of such a large issue: “This problem is 
not something that a board and a university does alone, it’s something that a 
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huge group of public universities would have to figure out, or it’s something 
that this country has to solve as a nation.”  
In the sub sections that follow, the perspectives of university decision 
makers will be compared to major themes found in the academic literature. 
However, some categories have been added because a particular theme was 
mentioned several times in the interviews, even though it was not a theme 
found in the literature.   
B. Price Discrimination  
Many university decision makers mentioned price discrimination when 
asked “what do you think are the primary factors driving up the price of tuition 
at public four year universities, or at UVM?” The university decision makers 
interviewed consistently stated that price discrimination was absolutely 
something UVM practices, and for a good reason: “The parties paying full 
tuition are subsidizing recipients of financial aid.”   
As seen in the Figure below the percentage of UVM students receiving 
need based financial aid has gone up. The percentage of Vermont students 
receiving financial aid is much greater than the average for out of state 




Figure 6. Percentage of UVM enrolled students who received need based aid 
divided by residency status.  Source UVM Source Books. 
 
One university decision maker commented that UVM is aware that the 
sticker price increase leads to a greater price for full pay students “We have 
what I call a high price high discount rate tuition model. We let the tuition go 
up all the time and then we discount significantly off that price for those that 
need discounts, the discounts meaning financial aid.” 
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At UVM there is a commitment to affordability and access. From the 
interviews, it seems as though one major way they ensure affordability and 
access is through price discrimination. The students from wealthy 
backgrounds are keeping the price low for students who need financial 
support. It isn’t UVM keeping the price low for these students of need: 
There’s a tuition model out there that people adopt, we don’t at the 
University of Vermont. That’s just a lower price across the board with 
little if any discounting. It should occur to you that the reason we do that 
in Vermont is that we allow the people that afford to pay, pay, and we 
discount for those low income and middle income students.  
UVM is committed to affordability and access for low and middle income 
students: “I think our tuition model is a really important one that commits to 
the middle class and low income class that we are going to do everything we 
can and those that can afford to pay, will pay.”  
One university decision maker reiterated what was found in the 
literature review about the value of price discrimination as a pricing strategy: 
“Perhaps if we took all of the dollars we give out in financial aid, then 
everybody can get a cut, but then you’re cutting for people who can afford it, 
and some can’t afford it.” As mentioned previously, economist Gregory 
Randolph argued that price discrimination is only a marginal factor driving up 
the price of tuition if utilized ‘correctly’, or as long as universities only price 
discriminate to provide greater access for students based on need, and not 
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other characteristics. The quotes in this section show that deciders feel they 
use price discrimination to serve the purposes of helping students who need 
financial aid. Therefore, according to economists such as Randolph, it is only a 
marginal factor driving up the price of tuition.  
However the graph below shows that the percentage of students receiving 
financial aid at UVM has increased. 
 
Figure 7. Growth in the percentage of UVM students who receive need based 
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According to Scott Wolla, price discrimination and financial aid increases 
tuition when the number of students admitted in need of financial assistance 
increases. As seen in Figure 7, the percentage of UVM students receiving need 
based aid has risen from 33% in 1992 to 51% in 2014 for out of state students, 
and from 46% in 1992 to 69% in 2014 for in state students. Wolla would argue 
that this is causing tuition to increase because a greater percentage of the 
student body needs financial aid.  
A couple of university decision makers mentioned the growing 
importance of international students in UVM’s ability to maintain such a 
pricing strategy: “The whole international student and pathways program has 
been important. Typically those students pay 100%. Paying 100% of the cost 
actually subsidizes somebody else to come here.” One mentioned it is actually 
becoming more difficult to find full pay students, which may drive an increase 
in international students at UVM: “The full pay students subsidize everybody 
else. They are harder to get demographically, so we can go internationally.” 
Below, Figure 8 represents the headcount of international students at 
UVM over time.  
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Figure 8. Dramatic increase in the number of international students at 
UVM over time. Data obtained from the UVM Source Books. 
 
The number of international students at UVM has increased since 2008. 
This is most likely because international students are full pay students. In 
2014 UVM hired an international student recruitment agency called Study 
Group. The goal was to triple the number of international students at UVM by 
2020 (or in 5 years). This would bring the total number of international 
students to nine percent of the student body by 2020. At the beginning of 
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the time, said the purpose of this initiative to bring more international students 
to UVM was to “improve the quality of student experience.”9 This reason is 
commonly used to support the logic behind the benefits of a more diverse 
student body on college campuses10. However, one could infer that UVM seeks 
to attract more international students because they are full pay students and 
this enables UVM to offer financial aid packages to more students who are in 
need, or high performing students who would choose UVM over another 
university if they were offered a better financial aid package.   
Discussing price discrimination in this way would also be consistent with 
Vedder’s view: “Colleges and universities practice price discrimination as well, 
but they generally disguise it.” (2004, p. 72). This is also consistent with 
Lawson and Zerkle’s analysis mentioned in section 2A1 that universities utilize 
price discrimination to systematically favor students based on need, merit and 
minority status.  
Some university decision makers expressed concern over the possible 
damages price discrimination could inflict. “Full pay families have 
opportunities to shop around.” They also mentioned that “the tax component 
can’t get too great. If it gets too high, parents or full pay families will see that 
and find another university.” Figure 9 represents the net price paid based on 
average income. As seen in the graph over the last few years, students who fall 
                                                             
9 http://vtdigger.org/2013/02/11/uvm-looks-to-triple-number-of-international-undergrads/ 
 
10 “The Diversity Imperative: The Compelling Case- Toolkit - Access & Diversity Collaborative - 
College Board,”  
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into the top income bracket pay an overall net price much higher than students 
in income brackets lower than them.  
 
Figure 9. UVM net price based on income. Data reflects net price for in 
state full time students. Data for net price based on income retrieved from 
IPEDS:http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/?q=University+of+Vermont&s=all&i
d=231174. Data for the in state total charges 2011 – 2014 retrieved from UVM 
Source Books. 
 
As shown in Figure 9, students from families who have an income of 
$110,001 or more pay an average of $22,482 for tuition and fees. One 
university decision maker mentioned the importance of thinking about UVM’s 













In state total charges
UVM In State Net Price Based on Income  
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in attracting students from wealthier backgrounds. Another university decision 
maker mentioned this as well: “Because of our price point, it’s really hard to 
not give some kind of merit aid, to make UVM more attractive.” These 
university decision makers could be right. Many deciders felt that simply 
thinking about tuition in a more meaningful way could be a step towards a 
remedy to the growth in the price of tuition (this is later discussed in section 
IV). Table 2 provides the sticker price of a few public universities currently 
ranked higher than UVM according to US News College Rankings. Note that the 
price listed is the total out of state tuition and fees sticker price. The 2nd 
column of the graph shows the difference between the out of state tuition and 
fees at universities ranked higher than UVM and the out of state tuition and 
fees at UVM. The 3rd column of the graph shows the difference between the out 
of state tuition and fees at universities ranked higher than UVM, and UVM’s in 
state net price for students from families whose income is $110,001 or more. 
The 4th column of the graph shows the difference between the out of state 
sticker price at universities ranked higher than UVM, and UVM’s in state net 
price for students from families whose income is between $30,001 and 
$48,000.  
  




Out of state 
tuition and 
fees 2013 - 
2014 
Difference from 
UVM out of state 
sticker price 
2013 – 2014 
($36,646) 
Difference from 
UVM in state 
net price for the 
$110,001 and 
more income 
bracket 2013 – 
2014 ($22,482) 
Difference from 
UVM in state net 
price for the 
$30,001 – $48,000 
income bracket 
2013 – 2014 
($11,407) 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst 
   
$28,159 -$8,487 +$5,677 +$16,752  
University of Connecticut  $30,970 -$5,676 +$8,488 +$19,563  
University of California - Los 
Angeles 
$35,575 -$1,071 +$13,093 +$24,168  
University of California - Berkeley $35,472 -$1,174 +$12,990 +$24,065  
University of North Carolina – 
Chapel Hill 
$30,122 -$6,524 +$7,640 +$18,715  
Virginia Tech $27,211 -$9,435 +$4,729 +$15,804  
Purdue University  $28,794 -$7,852 +$6,312 +$17,387  
Ohio State University $25,757 -$10,889 +$3,275 +$14,350 
Note: data obtained from http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator. 
  
Table 2 demonstrates the validity of the university decision maker’s 
comment about the importance of merit aid. For example, a prospective in state 
UVM student may attend Ohio University and pay only $3,275 more to attend a 
higher ranked school as an out of state student. $3,275 is just the sticker 
price, this number does not factor in any scholarships or financial aid. It seems 
that in order for UVM to remain competitive in attracting in state students from 
wealthy backgrounds, they must offer merit aid.  
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Overall university decision makers discuss price discrimination as an 
effective and necessary pricing strategy that allows the university to increase 
access and affordability for students in need of financial assistance. There is 
some evidence that UVM disguises price discrimination. One example is the 
initiative to increase the number of international students at UVM in order to 
“improve the quality of student experience.” The real reason is most likely 
because international students are full pay students. This would provide 
revenue for UVM and help subsidize more students of need. There were also 
some university decision makers that were concerned that price for wealthy 
students could become high enough so that wealthy students may choose 
other universities. 
C. Management issues   
University decision makers at UVM mentioned management issues as a 
frustrating but unchanging reality of higher education. Some economists such 
as Archibald and Feldman feel management issues are only a marginal factor 
that have contributed to the growth in the price of tuition. However, as 
mentioned in section 2A3 other economists feel management issues compile 
and create a major factor. In this view, management issues lead to internal 
inefficiencies: a lack of accountability and poor governance. The combination of 
these factors increase costs. Some of the themes mentioned in this section may 
also be similar to themes mentioned in the ‘nature of higher education’ section 
since the two categories overlap.  
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Some university decision makers discussed the inefficiencies created by 
the rigidity of governance in higher education. These deciders argue that 
“institutions of higher education are inflexible in ways that add costs.” One 
university decision maker discussed a way in which universities are inflexible 
that creates an obstacle for initiatives that might help cut costs: 
Change is difficult in this setting. You know a CEO goes to the Board and 
they do it, whereas in higher education, the President, faculty Senate and 
Board must all buy into the change. So the President must convince the 
Faculty Senate and Board to get behind an initiative. 
Archibald and Feldman discussed academic ratchet as one way in which 
the governance structure of higher education may increase costs. Academic 
ratchet describes the effects of faculty as a part of the university governance 
structure. According to this concept, inefficiencies arise because faculty pursue 
outcomes according to their own interests and incentives. Sometimes, the 
outcomes that faculty find desirable do not align with what would be most 
efficient for the university. One example of how academic ratchet might 
increase costs is something the Davis Educational Foundation label as 
“Mission Drift” (p. 6). The following quote from a university president featured 
in the report by the Davis Educational Foundation summarizes mission drift 
well: 
Like other institutions, we may well have experienced “mission drift” by 
straying into new areas in response to specific opportunities, yet without 
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the depth of resources needed to sustain both new and continuing 
programs. The challenges of supporting a much wider array of academic 
programs were not apparent during a period of robust economic growth 
combined with enrollment increases. But now it is abundantly clear that 
neither (we) nor most higher education institutions can sustain the 
patterns established over recent decades. We must focus strongly on 
those programs for which there is a demand, programs for which there is 
a compelling case for university involvement. (p. 6)  
Several examples of this arose out of the interviews with UVM decision 
makers. Most of the comments focused on the role of the Faculty Senate in 
cutting programs that are inefficient and add costs: 
I mean faculty have control over the curriculum. A lot of the costs of 
instruction relates to the curriculum. Faculty tend to not think so much 
about the costs of things. They are thinking about what should students 
know, and what makes a really good education. 
Many deciders feel that there is a constant struggle between decreasing 
costs of increasing quality (this is further discussed in the ‘nature of higher 
education’ section). One university decision maker emphasized the rigid and 
political nature that can lead to ‘mission drift’: 
Sometimes people hold onto the way we have always done things. We’ve 
always had a major and a minor. We’ve always had, you know, a minor 
in religion for example. So once you have all those majors and minors 
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you have to put up courses so that the students can complete them. So 
sometimes you could have very few students in a program, yet it 
continues. Now, the Faculty Senate is supposed to take charge and 
eliminate programs that are no longer in demand, but in fact that will 
never happen because it is hard for faculty to say no to each other. Some 
of it is well people in the department of religion think they need so I’m 
going to respect them because they know. That’s kind of an unspoken 
rule that if I leave them alone, they’ll leave me alone. We won’t look too 
closely at these things. 
The previous comment reflects the possible political incentives in place 
that would lead to inefficiencies. Another decider made the following comment: 
“If a degree program gets eliminated then what happens to those faculty, do 
they lose their jobs? Nobody wants to be part of a decision to cause somebody 
to lose their job.” The reality might also be that the Faculty Senate lacks the 
necessary incentives to eliminate inefficient programs, maybe because they are 
more focused on quality rather than efficiency.   
Other university decision makers emphasized misplaced incentives and 
biases present in the governance structure as a factor affecting costs: “I think 
the legislative trustees care about Vermont students and families, and lose 
sight of the vast amount of tuition we collect from out of state students.” These 
types of comments seemed to be out of concern for the future of UVM. As 
shown by the price discrimination section, out of state students generate a lot 
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of revenue and help UVM in remaining accessible and affordable for students 
in need of financial assistance. UVM has an incentive to attract out of state 
students, because out of state students generate more revenue. However, 
legislative trustees have an incentive to put in state students first because 
doing so appeals more to their constituents. This is just one example of how 
misplaced incentives can lead to inefficiencies.  In fact, three of the five 
University decision makers interviewed expressed concern over bias of 
legislative trustees affecting the university’s overall ability to increase revenue.  
There are some ways UVM has tried to address management issues and 
governance issues. These efforts will be discussed later in section 3.  
D. Labor 
University decision makers at UVM emphasized people, or labor, as a 
major factor driving up the price of tuition. All five university decision makers 
mentioned labor as a major factor driving up costs.  
Some simply mentioned salaries as a cost driving the need to obtain 
more revenue:  
Obviously, many things cost more with each passing year, and the 
biggest driver of course is people; 68% of our operating budget is the cost 
of people and so salaries and benefits, including health insurance, are 
key elements of the driver. And, there’s always a balancing act in terms 
of having salaries such that you can attract the kind of talent and 
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provide the good education that students deserve and want and at the 
same time keeping costs down.  
Others mentioned unions as a factor driving up the price of tuition. A few 
mentioned that they are not necessarily against unions, but it’s important to 
acknowledge that union contracts impose a cost: “Not that I am anti-union at 
all, but I think it’s important that it really limits the places we can go for 
money.”  
Some university decision makers emphasized the uniqueness of unions 
in New England compared to other regions: 
There are some uncontrollables here. I think it’s common in New 
England, it’s not on the west coast or the mid-west, to have unions in 
this way. Once those salaries are negotiated, that increases the amount 
you need each year. There’s two choices to address that: cut expenses 
elsewhere or increase tuition or a combination thereof. 
 Others discussed the limitations unions place on the university’s 
financial abilities: “Some places freeze tuition, they say ‘we’re really going to 
make an effort to reduce costs for our students and so we need to freeze raises 
for three years’. We can’t do that at UVM, to employees that are unionized.”  
In addition, some discussed how unions contribute to the rigid nature of 
universities, which as discussed in previous sections, can limit efficiency: 
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In the case of the University of Vermont, most of our labor is under 
union contracts. Those are negotiated contracts that run over a few 
years, so once the contract has been negotiated it’s a given. You know 
that’s the contract that we have to live with.  
Another theme mentioned in this section is benefits packages imposing 
major costs on universities. One university decision maker mentioned the 
increasing cost of healthcare, which increases the costs of the benefits 
packages for faculty and staff:  
The cost of health insurance has gone up astronomically, so if inflation is 
going at 1 % or less, the cost of health insurance goes up 12%, 13%, 
14%, remember 65% of our expenses are in labor so that’s a very large 
disproportionate increase for us. 
The report from the David Educational Foundation also provided a 
comment from one university president on the increasing costs of healthcare: 
“senior professors earn higher salaries and tend to exert upward pressure on 
group health insurance costs. A generational transition is underway now and 
may result in some measure of savings in salary and benefits.” 
Some stressed the significance of faculty salaries specifically, as opposed 
to labor in general:  
10 or 12 years ago we were pushing tuition up by a lot, and if I 
remember correctly, at the time it was because the president of the 
university did not feel we were paying faculty enough, I think that you 
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could look at the tuition increases and see that they were significantly 
tied to increases in faculty salaries. 
Some university decision makers discussed the sometimes frustrating 
necessity of increasing faculty benefits and salaries: “We have to remain 
competitive to attract great faculty.” The report from the Davis Educational 
Foundation featured a couple quotes from university presidents on this issue: 
“entitlements like faculty sabbaticals, retirement benefits, professional 
development/travel and research support continue to affect the bottom line. 
Institutions have a hard time rolling back these commitments even in tough 
budget environments” (p.4), and “Compensation and benefit cost are a 
significant part of our operating budget. To attract and retain top faculty and 
staff, we face continued pressure to spend more” (p. 4). 
In the previous section on Baumol’s cost disease, it is noted that 
Archibald and Feldman mentioned the theme ‘Administrative lattice’ as a factor 
contributing to increasing labor costs of universities.  Administrative lattice 
describes the growth in administrative support as universities have grown. A 
few university decision makers mentioned this as a factor contributing to the 
growth in the price of tuition. One decider mentioned the need for more staff 
that has developed with greater demand for higher education:  
When I went to school, people applied to like 3 schools, now people apply 
to like 7- 10. So, just the administrative work that comes with that. Then 
everyone who is admitted you have to provide a financial aid package for. 
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So you’re not providing a financial aid package for the 2500 kids who are 
coming here, you’re providing for the 10,000 kids admitted. So I think 
there’s all this work that has happened with the college selection 
process, which you can’t just not do.  
Some deciders felt the increase in staff was a necessity in order to fulfill 
the overarching goals of the university: “Some universities decide to spend 
funds on professional advisors and that allows faculty to teach and do their 
research.” Others felt that the increase in staff labeled as ‘executive, 
administrative and managerial’ or ‘other’ is something that needs to be 
revaluated: “At some point we have to acknowledge the bloated administrative 
staffs at universities.” As shown by Table 1 in section 2A3, administrative staffs 
at universities have grown. 
One university president discussed the growing number of 
administrators in the report from the Davis Educational Foundation: “Part of 
the growth in the number of administrators is the growing professionalism of 
administrative tasks like admissions, fund-raising, and student support 
services” (p. 5). 
A few deciders also, thematically, mentioned Baumol’s cost disease as a 
possible factor contributing to the growth in the price of tuition:  
Yes, so the bottom line is that we are a people based entity, we’re in a 
mature industry, and one in which labor remains a significant cost. We 
all know the reason we can buy a car today for the same nominal dollars 
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I paid for one in 1980 is because there are robots making those cars now 
and not people, but that’s not the way it works in higher education. And 
so, it’s very clear that that’s the driving force. 
As mentioned in the previous section, Economists Archibald and 
Feldman stressed Baumol’s cost disease as a major driver in the increase in the 
price of tuition. One decider essentially summarized what Figure 4 
demonstrated: “Higher education is inherently a people’s business with 
relatively low productivity gains.”  
According to the interviews, labor was emphasized as a major factor 
driving up the costs. They felt labor increases costs in a variety of ways. Some 
felt that unions contributed to the rigid nature of higher education that leads to 
inefficiencies, some felt that the growth in demand for higher education has led 
to increased administrative staffs, and some felt that universities had to 
increase benefits and salaries of faculty, regardless of productivity increases, to 
remain competitive in the industry. None of the university decision makers 
knew the term “Baumol’s cost disease”, however, they expressed the concept in 
their comments.  
E. Bennett Hypothesis  
As mentioned earlier, the Bennett Hypothesis states that increases in 
financial aid leads to increases in tuition. Many deciders discussed financial 
aid as an enabler to the growth in the price of tuition. Each decider had a 
slightly different perspective on how the Bennett Hypothesis may contribute to 
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the growth in the price of tuition. Some made simple, general, statements such 
as this one: “Student loans facilitate and drive higher revenue growth for 
academic institutions.”  
One decider expressed concern over student awareness in regards to the 
price of tuition, and the lasting effects of student loans: “There needs to be 
greater controls on student lending, especially when they don’t care what the 
tuition is.” I think it’s notable that this university decision maker’s perspective 
is that students “don’t care about what tuition is.” 
Others discussed the growth in the price of tuition in a more strategic 
way. In other words, they explained how financial aid can be used to attract 
students, or increase revenue. One decider mentioned that they actually seek 
consultation from outside sources on this issue: “We have asked for someone 
to come in from behavioral economics and teach us about how students and 
families will respond to cost.” Two deciders explicitly outlined how financial aid 
can be used strategically to increase revenues. This plan would also encompass 
an increase in tuition:  
This isn’t our model, but I have a peer at another school, and one of the 
things they did is they opted to increase their tuition by 4%, and then 
increase their aid, and in the end it produced several millions dollars 
more in tuition revenue because of the perception it created for the 
families was that they were getting a better financial aid package. 
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Another decider provided a much more detailed description of the 
scenario outlined by the previous comment:  
If we increased tuition by $2,000, and so you have a $10,000 scholarship 
instead of an $8,000 scholarship, and my price would have been the 
same, but now I’m going to choose you because I felt really good about 
the $10,000 scholarship, and my price point is the same.  
The Bennett hypothesis states that increases in financial assistance lead 
to tuition increases. These deciders are actually discussing using financial aid 
to generate more revenue, however, the Bennett Hypothesis may still apply.  
Without financial aid, the university in the example would not have raised 
tuition by $2,000, so it is the existence of financial aid, and the ability to raise 
the amount of financial aid that led to the tuition increase in the example 
provided by the decider.   
One decider made this comment about financial aid: “When you increase 
tuition you have to increase aid, so at some point it becomes a wash.” That 
comment may be a little concerning because it demonstrates a shallow 
understanding of the complex effects of increasing tuition, and financial aid as 
shown in Figure 9, changes in financial aid and tuition affect different groups 
of students in different ways.  
The Bennett Hypothesis implies that increases in financial aid will lead to 
increases in tuition. One university decision maker made the following 
comment: “Growth of financial aid has been enormous. The growth in financial 
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aid has way outpaced the growth of tuition in the past ten years. That was 
really important in the recession, but the growth has continued.” Because this 
university decision maker implied that financial aid has actually increased at a 
rate faster than tuition, one could infer that they do not agree with the Bennett 
Hypothesis. Financial aid has grown, but tuition has grown with it. The 
Bennett Hypothesis, and price discrimination complement each other. The 
growth in the price of tuition has disproportionality affected students from 
wealthier backgrounds because they receive much less financial aid. The 
Bennett Hypothesis itself states that an increase in financial aid leads to 
increases in tuition, so a huge growth in financial aid would lead to a growth in 
tuition. Also, shown in the figure below, neither the net price of tuition and 
fees, nor the tuition and fees and room and board (TFRB) has decreased. It has 
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increased along with the tuition and fees or T
 
Figure 10. Average net price over time for FTE students at public four year 




It is also important to note that there is a lot more depth to the data 
represented in Figure 10. Although the average net tuition and fees has grown 
by 73%, the published tuition and fees has grown by 114%. Even though the 
net tuition and fees has grown less than the published tuition, and fees, it is 
important to note that the net tuition and fees is an average of all students at 
public four year universities.  As outlined in the price discrimination section, 
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students from wealthy families pay a price much closer to the published price 
of tuition and fees, than do students from middle or low income households.  
Published tuition and fees have grown 41% more than the net tuition and fees. 
If there was data on the net increase for students from households with 
incomes of $110,001 or more, one could infer that these students experience a 
much greater increase in tuition.  
The intended effect of increasing financial aid is to help students afford 
the costs associated with going to college. However, tuition has gone up at such 
a fast rate that financial aid does not help students nearly as much as it did 
years ago. For example, the Pell grant began in 1972 with the intention of 
helping students from low income families afford college. According to an 
article in the Huffington post, “Where the maximum Pell Grant once covered 
the entire cost of obtaining a two-year degree and 77% of the cost at a public 
university in 1980, it now covers only 62% of the cost of a two-year degree and 
36% towards a public four-year degree” (Kingkade, 2012). It is pretty clear that 
the net cost of attending college has gone up because growth of tuition has far 
exceeded the growth of financial aid. The Bennett Hypothesis implies that 
universities will capture those increases in aid for themselves by increasing 
tuition. None of the university decision makers discussed the decline in 
financial aid as a percentage of the cost of college, and the effects it can have 
on students. In fact, one university decision maker said that financial aid has 
“way outpaced the growth of tuition in the past ten years.” This comment is 
concerning because it implies college has actually become more affordable, 
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which simply is not true. However, a university decision maker seems to believe 
it is true. They hold a position of power in which they may make decisions that 
affect financial aid and tuition for students. Ideally someone in that position 
would have a deeper and more accurate understanding of financial aid.  
F. Physical Upkeep  
One theme mentioned by multiple deciders was physical upkeep. This 
was not a theme found in the scholarly literature. However, it is relevant to the 
perspective of university decision makers because it was consistently 
mentioned during the interviews. Government regulation and the nature of 
higher education may also be related to physical upkeep:   
One major challenge and a challenge for many 4 year universities has 
been the aging physical plants. We have buildings that are not expense 
efficient, they’re not heating efficient, they require tons of maintenance, 
they’re you know 50, 60, 70, 80 years old, I mean you’re familiar with 
that. Staying on top of them in some cases require tearing them down, 
which is what we are doing with the STEM facilities. We are building new 
buildings and taking on more debt. You have to pay the interest at least 
if not interest and principle on debt and that’s an increasing cost. 
Maintenance of buildings is relevant to government regulation. Some 
deciders mentioned that the reason upkeep of these buildings is so expensive is 
because it must be done in a particular way due to historical preservation 
issues: “The other really big expense, for an older school like the University of 
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Vermont is building upkeep, and then the fact that everything is a historical 
building, so you have to do it a particular way, is unbelievable.”  
The inference I make from this, as to how it contributes to the growth in 
the price of tuition, is that it increases costs, which increases the need for 
revenues, and tuition is a major revenue generator. I did not come across 
anything in the literature about the maintenance of old buildings contributing 
to the growth in the price of tuition over time. One could infer that over time 
buildings have aged and required more upkeep, and this is reflected in the 
growth in the price of tuition, but it is most likely a marginal factor.  
G. The Nature of Higher Education 
Many deciders mentioned “the nature of higher education.” University 
presidents discussed the nature of higher education in a variety of ways. “The 
nature of higher education” was a term used by the university decision makers 
interviewed, it was not a term found in the literature. However, I will infer that 
what the deciders meant was the characteristics associated with higher 
education as an industry. Economists such as Richard Vedder (2010) would 
say the nature of higher education is defined by the following characteristics: 
third party payments, nonprofit status which contributes to a lack of a ‘bottom 
line’, unclear ownership, complex governance, resource rigidities, barriers to 
entry, restraints on competition, public support regulation and control, rent 
seeking, price discrimination, and cross subsidization11. However, most 
                                                             
11 A full description of each of these characteristics can be found in Vedder’s introduction to 
Doing More with Less: Making Colleges Work Better. (p.1-5)  
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descriptions of “the nature of higher education” would align with the 
characteristics outlined by Economists Archibald and Feldman (2008), and 
their view on the growth in the price of tuition:  
Costs are going up because of the nature of the industry, not because 
anyone is doing anything. In contrast, higher education-specific 
explanations often place blame on particular actors. We don’t mean to 
deny agency. There certainly are individual agents such as college 
administrators, members of boards, legislators, and governors, all of 
whom are responsible for decisions that affect costs in higher education. 
Rather than denying agents their role, our analysis highlights the 
constraints agents face when they make the decisions that result in 
higher costs. Our analysis suggests that higher education decision 
makers are faced with choices that result in either rising costs or 
declining quality. (p. 31)  
One decider discussed the incentives to generate revenue in higher 
education:  
America’s economy is driven by competition and in higher education the 
incentives to compete on quality are high and the incentives to compete 
on price are low . . . People assume that when a college saves on cost its 
price comes down or at least doesn’t go up as much. But this never 
happens because there is every incentive to plow that savings into 
increased quality.  
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One university president thematically mentioned Bowen's Revenue 
Theory in the report by the Davis Educational Foundation, a theory detailed in 
section 2A4: 
Much less has been said, however, about the competitive and 
marketplace dynamics that have been in even greater measure 
responsible for the growth agenda. I believe that these dynamics are at 
the root of the problem, and I am sure make the internal dynamics of 
cost expansion much more difficult to resist or correct. (p.1) 
There seems to be more pressure on universities to add and expand, 
rather than cut costs and scale back. Another university president made a 
similar comment:  
America’s economy is driven by competition and in higher education the 
incentives to compete on quality are high and the incentives to compete 
on price are low . . . People assume that when a college saves on cost its 
price comes down or at least doesn’t go up as much. But this never 
happens because there is every incentive to plow that savings into 
increased quality. (p. 2)  
Bowen’s Revenue Theory predicts that universities will raise as much 
revenue as possible, and then spend all of it towards the goals of increasing 
prestige, excellence, and influence. This creates inefficiencies, though, because 
the focus of the university is on increasing prestige, not keeping costs down.  
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It should come as no surprise that as governing boards and 
administrators seek to influence the rankings, costs (and prices) 
increase. I believe that the U.S News rankings have been one of the most 
powerful (and pernicious) forces driving colleges toward deliberate 
inefficiencies (p. 2) 
It is difficult to measure the priorities of universities over time. Some 
deciders mentioned the commitment to student outcomes as a theme in terms 
of the nature of higher education, and this may drive costs because it is the 
first priority, not keeping costs down.  
The way to do it and to do it well, is to make sure, and this university 
has been very much focused on academic excellence and student 
outcomes. The worst thing you can do is cut expenses at the expense of 
student outcomes. 
A couple of UVM deciders mentioned the nature of higher education as it 
applies to labor. One university decision maker discussed how the rigid nature 
of higher education makes it difficult to fire anyone employed by the university. 
This university decision maker has worked at other universities and was 
discussing the process generally as it applies to university staff:  
In higher education in general, we don’t work like a corporation. So if 
someone isn’t doing their job well, we’re probably going to keep that 
person on for a very long time. It’s not like I can sit down and be like 
‘you’re not performing well, here’s your two weeks’ notice. Instead it’s a 
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very long documentation process, to the point where it would just be 
easier to not deal with it. It gets so complicated.  
The same university decision maker discussed more thoughtfulness, and 
consideration during probationary periods as a solution to being ‘stuck’ with 
inefficient workers: 
I don’t know if we are thoughtful as we should be about really thinking 
about fit during that probationary period, because it’s not our culture, I 
mean that in higher Ed., not necessarily UVM. The culture is to educate 
and learn and try to grow.  
Overall, it is hard to measure how the nature of higher education has 
contributed to the growth in the price of tuition at public four year universities 
because it is difficult to define and measure the nature of higher education over 
time. However, when asked the following question, “what do you think are the 
main factors driving up the price of tuition at public four year universities or at 
UVM?” many deciders discussed the nature of higher education, so I felt it was 
important to provide this information as a part of their perspectives on this 
issue.  As mentioned in the beginning of this section, economists diverge a little 
bit on the characteristics of higher education that contribute to the growth in 
tuition. Vedder emphasizes more internal issues, and economists such as 
Archibald and Feldman emphasize the nature of higher education as a service 
industry. Most comments aligned with Archibald and Feldman’s description of 
the nature of higher education. 
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H. The Amenities War 
As mentioned previously, Economists McCall and Stange have shown 
that universities experience demand-side pressure to invest in consumption 
amenities, rather than academic quality. One decider mentioned the general 
increase in demand for services for students: “I think there’s a big expectation 
from families that we provide a lot of services to students.” Surprisingly the 
university decision makers did not mention many of the amenities discussed in 
the article by McCall and Stange: residence halls, fitness centers and food 
services.  
Another decider went on to discuss some aspects of universities that are 
expected now: “Mental health counselling, ACCESS, you know if you go back to 
the 70s or 80s that didn’t exist. Again, I think these are all really good things 
that help students be successful. But of course, it costs money.” It’s not just 
about the extra amenities that make universities more competitive in attracting 
students, but the deciders expressed that overall there has been a broadening 
expectation of services that should be provided by universities.  There isn’t a 
normative explanation as to whether or not it is ‘bad’ for universities to respond 
to demand for amenities. Another decider discussed how student demand has 
affected quality of instruction:  
If I was 18, what would I want to know about this faculty member. It’s 
way cooler that this faculty member has done all this work on how food 
77 | C u d é  
 
network shows are changing America's diet versus the faculty member 
with the NSF grant on blah blah blah. 
Another decider discussed some of the more unique aspects of 
universities that might attract students: “In general it’s much easier to walk on 
campus and be like, cool they have a rock climbing wall, and the residence 
halls are really nice.” All of these extra amenities may drive up costs. However, 
according to the scholars, these kinds of amenities are only marginal in the 
growth of the price of tuition. In an inside higher ed. article (2015) Economist 
David Feldman made the following comment in reference to Louisiana State 
University’s 85 million dollar lazy river project: “Lazy Rivers are only a tiny 
piece of the costs.” In addition, James Kadamus12 found that campuses that 
invest in recreational facilities often have existing facilities that are in need of 
repair. Kadamus also found that investment in these types of amenities do not 
have any significant effect on enrollment. However, Jacob, McCall, and 
Stange’s article contradicts Kadamus’s view. These types of investments do 
affect enrollment. Particularly, large investments in amenities attract students 
who do not qualify for highly competitive institutions.    
Multiple UVM deciders mentioned demand for the STEM building 
currently under construction at UVM:  
                                                             
12 James Kadamus is the vice president for a firm that advises colleges on their physical assets.  
- Slightlines 
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You know we’re building a STEM center over here, we aren’t building it 
for the sake of having it, and we’re building it because it’s what’s needed 
to provide the type of education that students are demanding.13  
Another UVM decider discussed the demand that led to the construction 
of the UVM STEM building: 
There’s an ever-growing demand in all the arenas of academia in terms of 
having enhanced skills and maybe technical in different ways. The 
STEM, the skills of folks that work in STEM are clearly highly technical. 
Even in the humanities there are different approaches but it is more 
capital intensive because English classes don’t require much beyond 
having a fairly standard classroom. Whereas opposed to chemistry, 
physics, and engineering, which is you know the stem building, there’s a 
lot of high tech need there.  
One question that could be raised is whether or not projects such as the 
STEM facility are costs related to educational quality of simply amenities for 
students (and faculty).  
The report from the Davis Educational Foundation (2012) also mentioned 
the increased demand for amenities:  
There is an imbalance between student and parent expectations, costs, 
and a family’s ability to pay…although it may seem to some that cost 
                                                             
13 This is relative to Archibald and Feldman’s discussion about cost disease and the way in 
which technological improvement can drive costs for universities – mentioned in section 2B1 .  
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escalation is driven by an increase in faculty and staff numbers and their 
salaries, it is accurately driven by broader ideas of what higher education 
means. College students and their parents expect the institution to be 
capable of providing all technological, social, and emotional support. In 
short, higher education offers the experience that parents and students 
have come to expect beyond their education, and there is a cost for this 
experience. (p. 3)  
The responses in this section indicate that growth in amenities, and 
demand for improvement has led to growing costs for universities, thus 
requiring them to improve quality and generate more revenue (through tuition). 
However, economists do not seem to think that spending on amenities is a 
major factor driving up the price of tuition at public four year universities. I 
only found two sources on this issue in the academic literature.  
I. Government Regulation  
Some deciders mentioned government regulation as a major factor. 
Government regulation was also mentioned in the previous section on physical 
upkeep. A couple deciders expressed concern over lack of understanding in 
terms of the effects of government demands: “Legislators are incredibly 
unaware of the regulatory overlay”, and “I am not sure that legislators are truly 
aware enough or thoughtful enough of about the cost benefit analysis 
associated with the initiatives imposed upon universities.” It seemed from the 
context that this university decision maker was referring to state government 
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regulators and legislative demands more so than federal government regulatory 
policies. However, it is possible they were referring to both.  
Many of the comments made by university decision makers in this 
section aligned well with Economist Elinor Ostrom’s definition of rules in use 
versus rules in form. Ostrom defines rules in form as the established legal 
rules and guidelines. Rules in use are how the party subject to the rules 
understand the rules. Rules in function is another distinction that could be 
made to define the effects and ‘successes’ of the rules once they are 
implemented. I believe that the frustrations voiced by university decision 
makers in regards to government regulation fit well into Ostrom’s framework. 
Its seems they are frustrated that legislators are not aware or thoughtful 
enough about the differences that may exist between the rules in form (the 
regulatory obligations inflicted upon universities) and the actual rules in use or 
function (how those obligations effect universities or the real level of effort 
required for those obligations to be fulfilled.)  
Another decider discussed their frustration with the lack of awareness of 
the costs imposed by certain government regulations:  
The constant compliance, the problem is not the doing, it’s the constant 
reporting out. When you constantly have to do reports back to the 
Department of Education or track things differently, to stay within the 
compliance for funding, it’s expensive. Either you have to grow your staff 
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in order to be compliant or you have to quit doing things that are 
important. 
  Another decider made the same point and was frustrated that those 
requiring this reporting are not adequately aware of the resources needed:  
As colleges and universities are asked to be more accountable, and a lot 
of the things we are asked to report on takes a lot of time, and a lot of 
effort. I’m not saying it’s not worthwhile, I just don’t know if there is an 
understanding of the cost of that. 
However, some deciders felt that government regulation didn’t actually 
contribute to the growth in the price tuition because “we would have to do all of 
that stuff anyways.” The deciders did not mention how this contributed to the 
growth specifically, but in a more general sense: “it is hard to keep up with the 
constant changing requirements and obligations.” Based on the interviews, it 
seems like government regulation is becoming an issue because of the growth 
in student populations, and amount of services provided by universities.  
J. Lack of State Support  
 As seen in Figure 11 and 12 below, UVM has low state funding relative 
to other states in the U.S. Some university decision makers emphasized this 
point: “In the case of the University of Vermont, our state appropriates at a 
very low rate on a per capita basis.” However, it is unlikely that this has 
actually led to the growth in the price of tuition at UVM over time, and one 
could infer that it may have affected tuition in other states based upon U.S. 
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averages. The below figure represents average state appropriations at public 
universities in the US over time in inflation-adjusted dollars: 
 
Figure 11. US averages of net tuition revenue per FTE student, educational 
appropriations per FTE student and FTE enrollment over time. Data obtained 
from State higher education executive officers association. 
 
As Figure 11 shows there has been a 129% increase in net tuition 
revenue per FTE student. There has been an 11% decrease in educational 
appropriations per FTE student. There has been a 43% increase in enrollment. 
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One could infer that one factor contributing to the 129% increase in net tuition 
revenue per FTE student is the combination of a 43% increase in the number 
of students combined with not an increase, but a 11% decrease in educational 
appropriations per FTE student.  
Compared to the average state appropriations in the US, state 
appropriations have always been low for Vermont public universities as shown 
in the figure below.; 
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Figure 12. Vermont net tuition revenue per FTE, educational appropriations per 
FTE and enrollment. Data obtained from State Higher Education Executive 
Officers Association.  
As shown in Figure 12 there has been a 68% increase in net tuition 
revenue per FTE student in Vermont. State appropriations per FTE student 
have decreased in real terms by $2,429 from 1990 ($5,633) to 2015 ($3,204) or 
a 43% decrease. There has also been a 36% increase in enrollment.  However 
there may be one way state appropriations could have contributed to the 
growth in the price of tuition at UVM, or other Vermont universities. In Figure 
12 the gap between enrollment and educational appropriations per FTE 
85 | C u d é  
 
student has become larger over time. The decrease in state funding coupled 
with the significant increases in enrollment starting in the early 2000’s may 
have impacted the price of tuition at UVM. 
Other deciders discussed state support broadly: “At public four year 
universities over the past 10 years, state support is falling. When state support 
falls and the need for financial aid climbs that puts enormous pressure on the 
revenue side of the equation.” 
Some mentioned general national trends: “Many of the states are putting 
less priority on higher education than they once were.” This puts UVM in an 
interesting positon. One UVM decider acknowledged the unique position UVM 
has been placed in as a result of their consistently low state appropriations:  
Nationally there hasn’t been the same state appropriations given, UVM is 
unique because there never has been big state appropriations given. So if 
you look over time at some of our peer institutions, maybe making very 
large tuition increases, where ours have been smaller. It’s because we’ve 
never had a big state appropriation. We haven’t experience the big shift 
from high state appropriations to low. 
It is also possible that the growing gap between decreasing state funding 
and increasing enrollment has affected many universities in the U.S. This gap 
can be observed in Figure 11 as well, representing the growing gap on average 
in the U.S.  
86 | C u d é  
 
IV. Possible Policy Prescriptions 
During the UVM interviews each decider was asked “are there any policy 
prescriptions, plan or proposals that you are aware of that you think would 
help remedy or solve the rapid growth in tuition at public four year 
universities?”  
There were several themes that emerged from the answers given by the 
deciders. Before describing the more common themes, I would like to outline 
some of the unique answers given by the deciders.  
Some university decision makers mentioned in the interviews that one 
way to remedy the rising costs of higher education is to limit price 
discrimination. This way universities wouldn’t experience a loss in revenue: 
“Our tuition is very high for a state school comparatively, and you don’t want to 
price yourself out of the market.” Some deciders felt that simply improving 
transparency could be beneficial: “I really like the idea of totally transparency 
of education of both the costs and the outputs.” 
Some university decision makers expressed pessimism about proposals 
to provide free higher education: “first of all nothing is free, the questions is 
who will pay for this?” Another decider discussed their worries about the way 
such programs might affect the quality of higher education: “If the federal 
government allows everyone to go to college for free than you end up maybe 
creating an environment of a lot of mediocre schools, unless the federal 
incentives are actually tied to good outputs.” Another university decision maker 
87 | C u d é  
 
discussed the same point: “What you want is to improve the quality and output 
of education. You don’t want to enable marginal, mediocre universities because 
the federal government is paying for it.” It was interesting that these deciders 
assume the quality would significantly decrease if the federal government was 
funding it (this might be an interesting area for further research).   
Other answers on possible policy prescriptions broke down into three 
main categories: lack of information, incentive based budgeting (IBB) and 
online learning.  
A. Lack of Information and Attention to Important Factors 
Many deciders mentioned concern over a lack of information.  Some felt 
it would be beneficial for deciders to connect with scholars more often; “the 
Board does not talk to experts, there are a few thought leaders that are well 
informed, when the time comes they speak up, and the other members listen.” 
Others emphasized the lack of attention to particular important factors:  
I think we could do better with comparables and really understanding 
the cost and discount. I think we should be much more visual, in the 
sense that, let’s talk about why UVM’s tuition is where it is and how it 
got there and what our costs are. It’s not just about cost, it’s a 
competitive advantage, and we lose really great students to other schools 
because of our costs. I think having an understanding, you know that’s 
not me saying woe is me I can’t do anything because we are too 
expensive, is really important. If I live in New York and I’m in the top 
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10% of my class I can go to any SUNY for free, I don’t know if they know 
that. 
Some mentioned it is important to be more thoughtful about the way 
tuition is considered at UVM. This decider asked: “For a top student in New 
York it’s $0 or $37,000 dollars, so I always say, what is the $37,000 dollar 
added value? That’s a hard one.”  
Another decider elaborated on the same question in regards to added 
value: 
It’s not just about cost, I think we need to think long and hard about 
what are we giving the student for $37,000, I mean beyond downtown 
Burlington and a beautiful lake and mountains. I mean those are some 
added values but I don’t know if it’s worth $37,000. So what else is 
there? 
Also mentioned was a general lack of drive to find solutions: “I think we 
say ‘Oh gosh that’s expensive’ but we don’t turn around and say ‘what are we 
going to do’ and that’s the important piece.” 
Some suggested solutions that would reduce labor and maybe increase 
efficiency: “You can use technology to reduce your workforce, I mean if you go 
to a paperless admissions process, we shouldn’t have as many people working 
in the admissions office.” and 
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I mean were in charge of our own budgets, I mean if I save the money I 
keep it, for me it’s just efficiency, I sometimes see what people are doing 
and I’m like oh we can automate that, and it might lead to better service. 
From my standpoint if you can automate something, you save money 
and get better service, why aren’t we doing that?  
Overall deciders felt more attention and thoughtfulness about this topic 
would have a positive impact on the process to finding a solution or a way to 
remedy the growing price of tuition at public four year universities.  
B. Incentive Based Budgeting (IBB)  
Some university decision makers mentioned the newly adopted incentive 
based budgeting (IBB) as something that might lead to less costs, and less 
increases in tuition.  Essentially one decider gave a good example of how this 
works at UVM: “with the incentive based budgeting, let’s say the engineering 
department finds ways to reduce costs, they get to keep those revenues within 
the department.”  
Some deciders mentioned the increased accountability that accompanies 
IBB  “The incentive based budgeting has been a move in the right direction, it 
helps different colleges become more accountable and have greater incentive to 
save money.” Specifically at UVM this is a new development, and many 
deciders mentioned the predicted increase in incentive to perform better: “a few 
years ago individual schools didn’t have incentive to manage revenues and 
90 | C u d é  
 
costs, those revenues went to the overall university, their individual school or 
department didn’t have a huge incentive to cut costs and increase revenues.” 
Some deciders talked about IBB as a way to improve quality without 
increasing costs:  
The whole incentive based budgeting thing, is really really important. If 
you have programs that are unpopular, and you can create a new class 
that will attract more students, then departments should be incentivized 
to do that, to do things that will make your particular college great. 
One decider mentioned the possible effect it will have on how much each 
college values students: 
It’s great (IBB), you know initially a college might not care if I give them 
200 students or 170 students. All of the sudden when there’s an 
advantage for them enrolling those students, I just feel like they are more 
engaged from the very beginning with those students. 
Some elaborated a little more on the current incentives: “I think there are 
some divisions that do it well and others that are slower, but the incentive is 
that you keep your savings.” 
It is important to note that IBB was recently implemented at UVM, so the 
long terms effects have not been observed yet. 
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C. Online Learning 
Many deciders mentioned massive open online courses (MOOCS) as a 
possible solution. Many seemed excited about MOOCS because they felt it 
could increase efficiency: “productivity is important, the online learning model 
can be used to lower costs per credit hour.” 
Many of these courses use technology to translate courses into versions 
that can be taken by a massive number of students. Some deciders felt it could 
cut costs for students because it would reduce the amount of time they would 
have to spend in college:  
The solution that I think has huge potential is the idea of somehow 
getting the online courses of some of the major universities accredited. 
So that perhaps we could take, what is now a 5 year or 6 year 
experience, but it should be a 4 year university, but if you could say 
everyone can transfer in 1 year of courses from accredited institutions, 
then you can shorten the amount of time students spend in college.  
MOOCs may be a good option for universities in terms of cutting costs 
and increasing revenues. However the literature indicates MOOCs may not be a 
great option for students. In the spring of 2013 San Jose State University 
(SJSU) signed a contract with a MOOC company: Udacity. SJSU hoped to offer 
an online option for a few introductory courses for a lower per credit hour 
price. However as shown in the table below, the initial results for the spring of 
2013 were not ideal: 
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Table 3 
Students Who Received a Passing Grade (C or higher) 
Course Spring 2013 Summer 2013 On-Campus (Avg. 
Based on Past Six 
Semesters) 
Elementary Statistics 50.5% 83.0% 76.3% 
College Algebra 25.4% 72.6% 64.7% 
Entry-Level Math 23.8% 29.8% 45.5% 
General Psychology N/A 67.3% 83.0% 
Intro to Programming N/A 70.4% 67.6% 
Note: Reprinted from Boost for Udactiy project: by Carl Straumsheim, retrieved from 
https://www.insidehighered.com, 2013.  
 
Although there was improvement in the summer of 2013, it is important 
to note that this is just the percentage of students who received a passing 
grade. It would be interesting to see the data broken down further by grade 
received. Earlier there was a discussion involving Holian and Ross’s ideas 
about how to implement some market forces into higher education. One way is 
to offer different prices for courses based upon different factors. For example, 
smaller classes could cost more. However, the Udactiy trial at SJSU reveals 
some potential concerns about introducing initiatives such as the one 
described by Holian and Ross.  In the example of SJSU, if courses taught on 
campus are more effective for students, then they might price them higher than 
courses taught online. However, this has some serious implications in regards 
to access and affordability. It might mean that the student from a low income 
background has to accept a lower quality education, than the student from a 
wealthy background who can afford the courses that are more effective.  
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 Although MOOC’s may be a beneficial innovation for higher education 
(with some improvement), I am not convinced that it would be a good idea to 
offer them for a much cheaper price. Rather, it might be less risky to introduce 
MOOC’s as an option for the same price, and if costs go down, then prices 
across the board could be lowered. 
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V. Conclusion  
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the growth in the price of 
tuition at public four year universities is a real and pressing issue of great 
concern for students and families in the United States.  
I compared the perspectives of university decision makers with the 
perspectives of scholars on the growth in the price of tuition at public four year 
universities.  
The academic literature review revealed that the major theories offered by 
economists on the growth in the price of tuition are price discrimination, 
Bowen’s Revenue Theory, the Bennett Hypothesis, Baumol’s cost disease, and 
management issues. There seems to be a general agreement among the 
scholars that the previously listed factors are all relevant factors contributing 
to the growth in the price of tuition over time. However, they seem to disagree 
on the level to which each factor has affected the growth in the price of tuition.  
 Interviews with UVM university decision makers, and the report from the 
Davis Educational Foundation formed the university decision makers’ 
perspectives on this issue. The major themes that characterize the university 
decision makers’ perspectives on the growth of tuition are price discrimination, 
management issues, labor, the Bennett hypothesis, physical upkeep, the 
nature of higher education, the amenities war, government regulation and the 
decline in state support. 
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 As described in the previous section, some of the explanations offered by 
the university decision makers did align with those found in the academic 
literature. However, there were some very clear differences between the two 
perspectives.    
The university decision makers brought up a variety of factors that the 
economists did not mention as factors driving up the price of tuition at public 
four year universities. These factors include unions, government regulation, 
increased amenities, and physical upkeep.  
 I found the following differences to be of most concern. The first and 
most surprising issue that I found to be quite concerning was that some 
university decision makers interviewed downplayed the significance of this 
issue because they did not feel that tuition was really rising. One university 
decision maker said that the “public higher education revenues per student 
have been almost flat in real dollars from 1985 to 2010.” As shown in the 
previous section, this is simply not true. In the U.S. on average, net tuition 
revenue per Full Time Enrollment (FTE) student in real terms has increased by 
129% from 1990 to 2015. In Vermont, net tuition revenue per FTE student has 
increased by 68% in real terms over the same time period. Another university 
decision maker said that “growth in financial aid has outpaced growth in 
tuition.” This is also simply not true. The net tuition and fees have increased by 
73% between 1996 and 2015. Over the last decade (or between 2005 and 2015) 
there has been a smaller increase of 38%, however, that is still an increase. So, 
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growth in financial aid has not outpaced growth in tuition. These comments 
are concerning because they come from university decision makers.  
The second issue I found concerning involved the comments about the 
rise of tuition being a “national issue”. Although the growth in the price of 
tuition at public four year universities in the United States is, by definition, a 
national issue, that does not mean the solutions must be national solutions. 
Four out of the five university decision makers interviewed made a comment 
similar to this one: “There are so many constraints. You can get an expert to 
say ‘yes you have a problem’. But how are you going to get the country to solve 
the problem?”, or “this is a national problem, the country has to fix it, one 
university can’t do anything about it.” 
The third difference I found to be concerning was how well informed 
university decision makers implied they were, compared to how informed they 
appeared to be. Most university decision makers claimed that they stay as up 
to date on this issue as possible on this topic. Although many university 
decision makers mentioned factors found in the academic literature, they did 
seem aware of the names of said theories or the names of the authors from 
which the theories originated. For example, most understood the concept of 
Baumol’s cost disease, but had never heard the term before, or read anything 
that explained its significance in higher education. The themes or factors 
described in the literature review section of this thesis are only the major 
themes, which were most commonly mentioned in the literature reviewed. 
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There are certainly more theories that are not mentioned in this thesis. As in 
most areas of research, there are prominent scholars who have dedicated their 
lives to researching the rising cost of tuition such as Vedder, Archibald, 
Feldman, and Ehrenberg.  It was surprising that many deciders were not 
familiar with these scholars or the names of major theories on this topic. 
This was discussed in the previous section concerning lack of 
information. Many deciders brought up concerns about their peers: “at the end 
of the day, a couple Board Members really keep up with the literature, and the 
others listen to those that are informed”, and “no I don’t think they know 
enough, I think they could do a better job staying informed.” This was 
concerning because some of these theories are the major theories on this topic, 
so not knowing the names of these theories or authors might imply that they 
are not aware of the academic literature on this topic.  
The fourth issue was the pessimism, or disinterest, in the possibility of 
connecting with the scholars that researched this topic. During the interviews, 
I asked the university decision makers if they thought it would be valuable to 
consult with, talk to, or connect with the economists that have spent their lives 
researching this topic. A couple deciders mentioned that this kind of 
conversation would be “interesting”. One decider even made the following 
comment, “We should be bringing in experts more often.” However, some 
expressed that this type of connection might not be valuable: “There are 
experts out there that spend their lives studying this topic, but here is my 
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issue; I think the thought of putting those experts with policy makers to solve 
the country’s problem is enormously important, it might be fascinating, 
inspirational, and eye opening for the university, but I still think our 
constraints are our constraints.”  
Performing a comparison of these two perspectives exposed some 
intriguing topics for further research that might be valuable. The purpose of 
this thesis was to simply compare the two perspectives. I hoped that 
performing a simple comparison of the two perspectives would prove that there 
is value in including the perspective of university decision makers when 
analyzing the growth in the price of tuition. The perspectives of university 
decision makers are valuable because they have a direct role in increasing 
tuition. I also think further research into their perspectives could increase 
transparency and accountability in higher education. Accountability is 
essential in assuring that university decision makers remain centered in their 
obligations to students.  
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